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ABSTAACi
This paper studíes a duopoly market in which firms are uncertaln about
demand and can draw Snferences concerning market demand from observations of
their production quantities and market price. We are especially interested ín
Che incentlves for the fírms to experlment, or adJust thelr outputs away from
myopically optlmal levels to affect the Snformativeness of the market prlce.
We show that experimentation occurs if information affects future optimal
actions and Sf current actions also affect information. We then develop
conditions under whích experlmentation introduces íncentives for firms to
elther increase or decrease output. Our primary departure from previous work
on strategic ínformation transmission arises out of the fact that firms'
quantities are observed in our model. As a result, experímentation allows
fírms to manlpulate not the directíon Sn whlch beliefs are revised (as Sn
signal-~amming models) but the extent to which belief revísion occurs. Firms
will adjust initial quantities to make prices either more or Iess informative,
and hence to lncrease or decrease the extent of bellef revislon, depending
upon whether information has positive or negative value. We present examples
showing that firms may adjust output in order to reduce the Snformativeness of
market prlce.STRATEGIC INFORMATION MANIPULATION IN DUOPOLIES
I. Introduction
This paper studies a duopoly market with uncertain demand. Flrms may
draw inferences concerning market demand froro observations of their production
quantities and the market price. Given this ability to deduce information
about demand from the market, the firms may experiment, or ad,Just their
outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of
the market outcome. Experimenting firms sacrifice current profits ín the hope
of affecting the information content of the roarket outcome in such a way as to
increase future expected profits.
We investígate the following questions. Under what condítions will firms
experiment? If they do experíment, will they attempt to increase or decrease
the informativeness of market price? Equivalently, when xill additional
information have a positive or negatíve value for the firm? Will incentives
to experiment create íncentives for firms to increase or decrease output7
Will Sncentives to experiment produce equilíbrium quantities that are higher
or lower than their myopically-optimal levels?
We consider two firms which produce a homogeneous product over two
periods. These flrms face a demand function that has a parameter which is
unknown to both firms as well as random noise. The latter masks the true
value of the unknown parameter so that neither firm can obtain perfect
information about the parameter from observing the períod-one price. In
perlod one, each firm chooses a level of production and a market price is then
realízed. We assume that both firms observe this price as well as industry
output. This information is used to update prior beliefs.
Our work can be compared xith four related types of analysis. Flrst,
Kamien, Tauman and Zamir (1987) have examined the value of information in a
game. In particular, they examine the value to an agent of information held
by that agent alone, where the agent ís not a player in the game and mayreveal information to one or more players. This value must always be
nonnegatíve, since the agent retains the option of ignoring the information,
and the interesting questions concern when the value Ss positive and how this
value Ss to be measured. In contrast, we are concerned with the incentlves
for a player to manípulate Snformation that is available to all players. A
player in a game may be made worse off by an increase in publlc information.
Second, the value of information in oligopoly games has been the sub~ect
of intensive research.í These studies typically assume either that firms
transmit information by means of "certifiable announcements" or that
Snformation is recelved from exogenously generated signals. Our model differs
Sn that the amount of information generated is deterroined endogenously by the
choice of first-period actions. Varying the amount of information in our
model is then costly. Firms can affect information flows only by bearing the
short-run reductions of profit caused by deviatfons from myoplcally optlmal
actíons.Z In addition, any information that is produced in our model is
available to all firms, so that firms always receive identical information.
This contrasts with previous models, in which firms receive private signals,
and causes information to exhibit some of the propertíes of a public good.
Third, studies have appeared of how a monopollst might vary quantity to
affect the informativeness of price.3 In a single-agent decisíon problem,
such as that facing a monopoly, more information is always better (or at least
no worse). The only question facing a monopolist then concerns how to adjust
quantity so as to increase the flow of information. In a game, such as a
1For a survey of this líterature and a list of references, see Okuno-
Fujíwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990).
2Ga1-Or (1988) exaroines a two-períod duopoly model in which first períod
choíces affect second-períod information concerning cost. The sígnals that
firms receive about costs in her model are privately observed, in contrast to
the publicly observed price sígnal in our model. In her model, the (random)
mapping from present choices to future bellefs is exogenously specified, with
larger outputs assumed to yield more information. In our model, that mappíng
ís endogenously determined through Bayes' rule.
3See Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1989a) for an example and references.duopoly, more informatíon can be detrimental. The possibility then arises
that duopolists will adjust their quantity so as to decrease the
informativeness of market price.
Fourth, the examples closest in spirít to a model of duopoly
experimentation are the "signal-jamming" models of Riordan (1985), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986), and Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1989b). In these models,
like ours, no fírm is perfectly informed about the state of nature and each
firm may have an incentive to manípulate the ïnferences drawn by ríval firms.
The prínclpal difference between these signal ,Jamming models and ours lles in
the observability of actíons. In signal-jamming models, fírms do not know,
even ex post, the actlons (for example, the quantities) chosen by rivals. Our
analysis is motivated by the observation that firms often may be able to
verify the actions taken by their rivals, and we assume that each firm can
observe its rival's output.4
This observability assumption has significant consequences for the way ln
which a fírm manípulates its rival's inferences. In signal ~ammíng models,
firms attempt to Snfluence the dlrection ín which a rival updates its bellefs.
For example, if quantity is the choice variable, then a firm may use an
(undetected) lncrease 1n output to lower price and convince a rlval that
demand is low. In our model, outputa are observed, so that the foregoing
manipulation of beliefs cannot occur. Instead, firms affect the informative-
4Aghion, Espinosa, and Jullien (1990) provide a complementary analysis of
duopoly experimentation. However, we examine a homogeneous-product, quantity
setting duopoly whíle they work with heterogeneous-product príce setters. We
examíne the abillty of firms to affect the dístribution of líkely market
prices, and hence information, by adjusting quantities. Their model is
constructed so that price dtsperston is required for the revelation of
ínformation. We devote consíderable attention to the question of when
information is valuable, while they often work with the presumption that
information is valuable and examine the steps taken by fírms in light of this
value. Their example of why the value of information may be negative in a
duopoly game is also quite different from ours, with Aghion, Espínosa and
Jullien workíng with a model ín which the complete-information equillbrium is
qualitatively different across the two posslble states of nature, with the
firms competing in one state and being effectively isolated in the other.ness of the commonly observed prlce signal. Firms in our model may then
affect the degree to which a ríval is líkely to update expectations, but not
the direction.
We begín with the question of when firms xill have an incentive to
experiment. We show that firms will experiment if optimal second-period
actions depend on second-period information ( i.e., if information matters) and
íf alterations in períod-one quantity affect the informativeness of period-one
price ( i.e., if i nformation can be manipulated). We show by examples that
cases can arise in which duopoly firms will face incentlves to experiment but
a monopoly ( or colluding duopolists) would not; and vice versa.
We next turn to the question of whether experimentation introduces
íncentives for fírms to increase or decrease their period-one outputs. We
develop sufficíent conditions for each case. We demonstrate that an increase
in lnformatíon Sn our duopoly game can make players worse off, in contrast to
a single-agent decision problem, presentíng an example in which the duopolists
ad~ust their quantities so as to decrease information. In contrast, if a
monopolist experiments, i t ís always ln the dlrectlon of lncreastng
informatíon.
Our analysis shows that the effect of experimentatíon on first-period
quantities is determined by the sign of the sum of four terms. One term
captures the incentive to experiment ín order to revise a firm's own belíefs;
two terms capture the incentive to influence revision of the ríval firm's
beliefs; and a fourth term captures the interaction between these first two
forces. The sign of each term ís Sn general ambiguous, though we are able to
establish signs for some interesting special cases.
These results describe the effect of experimentation on the best response
map of a single firm. The question remains of how the effects of
experimentation on firms' best-response maps interact to affect equilibrium
outputs. We demonstrate that íf prior beliefs are the same and if informationís valuable, then industry output will be adjusted in the directlon which
generates more informatíon. We then develop conditíons under which infor-
mation is valuable and under which the dírection of increasíng information can
be identifíed. At the same time, we demonstrate by example that it is
possible that industry output ad~usts so that the price signal is less
informative.
Finally, we address the questíon of existence of equilibrium. A subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist in this model because the
objective function (after the two-period game is "rolled back" into a single
period game) may not be not quasiconcave. Hence, in general the pure strategy
best response will be a correspondence that is not convex-valued, so that
standard existence arguments are inapplicable. On the other hand, we give
suffícient conditions for exlstence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and
provide mixed strategy versions of our main fíndings.
Section II constructs the two-period duopoly model. Section III develops
conditions under whlch flrms wlll experiment and develops conditions under
which this experimentation introduces incentives for firms to inerease or
decrease quantíty. Sectíon IV examines the effect of experimentation on
equilibrlum quantities. Sectlon V considers Lhe exlstence of equillbrium.
Section VI summarizes the results and concludes.
II. The Model
We consider a two-period, homogeneous-products duopoly. For símplicity,
we assume that production costs are zero (or that P is price net of a constant
marginal cost that is the same for both fírms). The inverse demand function
is given by P- g(Q,7) t e, where P is market price, Q is industry output, T
is an unknown parameter, and e is the realization of a random varíable, c,
whose distribution ís characterized by a continuously differentiable density
function f(~) with fin ef(e)de - 0. We assume that -m(A1) 7 takes on one of two possible values, 7 or 7;
(A2) g(0,7) ~ 0 for 7- 7 and 7- 7:
(A3) g(Q,7) ls nonincreasing on 6t~ and strictly decreasíng
{Q: g(Q,7)~0}):
(A4) g(Q.7) Yields a unique myopic equilibrium;
on
(AS) g(Q,7) z 8(Q.ë) for all Q e 62}, so that 7- 7 corresponds to the
"good" state of demand.
Each fírm begins period 1 with a prior probabílity distribution over (7,~}.
Let p~ denote firm 1's prior belief that 7- 7 for 1- 1,2. We assume that
these prior beliefs are common knowledge.
41e wili generally assume that the firms have common príors, or p- po.
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However, in Section III and one example in Section IV we allow the possibilíty
that pi x p2. Thls allows the firms to have different prior expectations,
even though these priors are common knowledge. It is ímportant to note that
we use dlffering priors for expositíonal purposes. In partlcular, none of the
results depend upon this assumptíon. However, the forces drivíng the results
are often easfer to isolate by provisionally allowing priors to differ. This
ís especially the case in Section III.
In period one, firm i chooses an output Q~. After these first períod
quantities are chosen, a value of e and hence P ls realízed. Firm i's
expected profit in period one is then
n~(Q1.Qz.P~) - 18(Q.7)p~ t g(Q.2')(1-P~)JQ~. (1)
where Q - Q1 } Qz.
LJe assume that firms observe first period price and
outputs, but not the realization of e. Consequently, firms may not be able to
determine the value of 7 after the first period. The observation of P,
together with knowledge of aggregate output, however, leads each fírm to
revise its beliefs regarding the value of 7. 4le assume that such rev)sions
proceed according to Bayes' rule, so that flrm 1's posterior belief that 7-7
7, denoted p~, is given by
pof(P-g(Q,7))
P1 - 1 (2)
p~f(P-8(Q,7)) a (1-Po)f(P-S(Q.~))
where Q is first perlod lndustry output and P is the reallzatlon of price Sn
petiod one.
We shall restrict the density function f(.) to ensure that larger
realízatlons of P lead to hlgher posterior bellefs Lhat 7~ 7 and hence that
the state of demand is "good". To do this, we Smpose the requírement that f
satisfy the monotone likellhood ratio property (MI.EtP), namely that
f'(e)
f E (3)
ís strictly decreasing on supp(f) (i.e., the closure of (e:f(e)x0}). It is
easily shown that (3) implies dp1ldP ~ 0 on {(P,Q):O~p1~1}.
s
In period 2, each firm agaln chooses a level of productlon Q~. Period 2
expected profit is therefore n~(Q1,QZ,p~) (where Qt denotes second períod
output for firm i and p~ is calculated from (2)).
We are Snterested in a subgame perfect equllibrlum of thls two-perlod
game. As usual, we analyze subgame perfect equilibria by first examíning the
second períod. By assumption, the second period subgame possesses a unique
r ~r
Nash equilibrlum for each vector of posterlor beliefs (pl,pz). Let
(Q1,Qz)
now denote this equilibrium. Firm i's period 2 value function, giving the
expected value of period-two profits as a function of posterior beliefs, is
then gíven by
y~(P1,Pz) ~ 18(Q..7)Pi t 8(Qr,~)(1-p~)1Q~,
where Q~ - Q1 t QZ and Q~ and Q~ are functions of (pl,pz).
In period 1, the posteríor bellefs (pl,pZ) are random variables whose
dístributíon depends upon first-period índustry output (as well as the
distributíon of P induced by e). We may therefore write each firm's period-8
one expected profit as a function of first period output:
II~(Q1,QZ.P~.Pz) - n~(Q1.Qz.P~) t óJV~(P1(P,Q).PZ(P,Q))h~(P)hP (S)
á ni(Q1.QZ.P~) t SW1(Q)
where ó ís the (common) discount factor and
h~(P) - P~f(P-g(Q,ti)) t (1-P1)f(P-g(Q,2')). (6)
Let I' denote the single-period game whose payoff functions are given by (5)
and let Q~(Q~) -{Q~ E argmaxo
TT~(Q1.QZ.pI.PZ)}
denote flrm 1's best reply
~
~f ~s .~
correspondence.s A Nash equilibrium of r is a pair (Q1
.QZ ) E P1(QZ ) x
r~
vZ(Qi ). Any such equilibrium will correspond to a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the original txo-period game.
III. The Value and Manipulation of Information
Thls section investigates the incentives, created by the effect of
period-one quantities on the informativeness of price, for firms to adjust
period-one quantities away from their myopically optimal levels. IJe compare
flrm 1's best reply mapping of r with its "myopic" reaction functíon, i.e.,
its reaction functlon when its payoff functlon is simply
n~(Q1,QZ,pi),
the
first term in (5). The two best reply mappíngs díffer in that the mapping
derived in I' takes into account the effects of first period choices on the
flow of information for period two, whereas the myopic best-reply functions
ignore such effects. A comparison of the two best reply mappings then
determines whether the presence of such information flows íntroduce incentives
SQ is a correspondence because the second term in II1 need not be concave
t
and hence v~(Q1) need not be a singleton.for a firm to increase or decrease first period output ( for a gíven output
level of the other firm).
(3.1) Best Reply Mapptngs
The relatlonshlp between the myoplc and nonmyopic best reply mappings ls
determined by W~(Q) (defined ín (S)). Specifically, íf W~(Q) ís increasing
[decreasing) in Q, then for any given perlod-one output of the other firm,
firm í's myopíc period-one best response will be less than (greater than) the
output specífíed by Q~(Ql), the best reply map for C.
We accordíngly derive dW1~dQ. To simplify our calculation, and to
facllitate interpretatlon of the resulting expression, we find it helpful to
use (2) to substitute one of the two posterior beliefs out of V1(p p). It
i' z
is perhaps most natural to elimínate p2 from firm 1's value function. Hence,
we rewrite (2) as
pf
p~(P.Q) - o- 1 0 (7)
plf t (1-P1)f
pf
P (P.Q) - 2 (8)
2 pzf r (1-PZ)f




and substitute this expression into (8) to obtain
PZ
pZPl(1-po)
0 0 0 0 - N(P1)' (9)
p2P1(1-pl) t ( 1-pZ)P1(1-pl)
The mappíng ~p(pl) gives firm 2's posterior belíefs as a function of 1's
posterior beliefs (and each firm's prior beliefs). Note that
~p' (Pl) -
pz(1-pz)po(1-pi)
) 0, (10)- 10
where n Ss the denominator in (9). Thus the two posterior bellefs are
perfectly positívely correlated. The magnitude ~p'(pl) ídentifies the rate at
which fírm 2 revises beliefs as firm 1 revises.6 If pi - pz, then ~p'(pl) - 1,
since in that case pl - pz for all realizations of P.
We now define U1:I0,1] -~ 6t by
so that
U1(P1) - V1(P1.~(pl)). (11)
W1(Q) - fUl(pl(P,Q))hl(P)dP. (12)
Differentiating (12) with respect to Q then yields
dW dp dh
dQl - ,JIUi(Pt) dQl
hl(P) t U1(Pi) dQl
,dP. (13)
Expressíon (13) can be manipulated to gíve (details of the derivation of (14)







2 i z i z i i
Uu(p ) - d V t 2 d V ~p' (P ) t d V I~C~ (p )Iz t aV ,~,~ (P ). (15)
i i dz d d i dz 1 dP i
pl pi pz Pz z
(3.2) Interpretation
The sign of the expression for dW1IdQ given in (14) reveals whether the
experimenting firm will have an incentive to increase output (dW1~dQ ~ O) or
decrease output (dW1~dQ ~ 0) compared to the myopic best response. Some
6As pZ converges to 0 or 1, ~y' converges to zero. Hence, the more
certain firm 2 initially Ss of the value of ~, the smaller will be the change
in firm 2'ó beliefs relative to changes in firm 1's beliefs. On the other
hand, as pl converges to 0 or 1, then ~p' converges to tm. Hence, the more
certain flrm 1 is ínitially of the value of r, the larger will be variations
in firm 2's belíefs relative to firm 1's.- 11 -
insíght into the forces determiníng the optimal output level for the
experimenting flrm can then be obtained by interpreting the terms contaíned in
(15). (The remalning terms in (14) wlll be considered in Sectlon (3.3).) It
ís here that it is helpful to have allowed firms to hold different priors,
since thís helps us disentangle the forces present in (15) by allowíng us to
separate firm 1's incentive to affect its own beliefs from the íncentlve to
affect firm 2's beliefs.
First, note that if all but the first term in (15) were absent, then the
resulting expression for dW1IdQ would match the analogous expression derived
for the monopoly case by Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1989a). The flrst
term in (15) thus captures the incentive for firm 1 to produce informatlon in
order to revlse its own belíefs.
To assess the sign of the first term in (15), St may be helpful to recall
the logic underlying the result that ín a single agent problem, the value of
informatlon is nonnegatlve. The value function for a single agent problem,
being the supremum of a collection of linear functions, is always a convex
functíon of the probabilities. Moreover, as demonstrated by Fusselman and
Mirman (1990), an increase in information produces a mean-preserving increase
in the riskiness of an agent's posterior beliefs (as seen by the agent before
the relevant signal is realized). The desired result then ímmediately follows
because the expected value of a convex functíon always rises with a
mean-preserving íncrease in rísk. This single-agent result suggests that the
first term in (15) should slmiarly be posítlve, or at least nonnegative.
However, the convexity of V1 in pl (equivalently, dZV1ldpi ~ 0, or a positive
fírst term in (15)), which ímplies that firm 1 prefers more to less
Snformation holdíng p2 constant, does not follow from the standard argument
for the single-agent problem. Even though pz and hence firm 2's second period
reaction function is held constant in the calculation of d2Vl~dpi, firm 2's
equillbrium output varies in pl. If this variation of firm 2's output is- 12
sufficiently adverse to firm 1, then firm 1 might prefer less to more
Snformatíon, even though such informatlon affects only firm 1's beliefs. The
sign of dZV1Idp~ ís thus potentially indeterminate, though ít can be shown
that it is nonnegative for all vectors of posterior beliefs if both g(Q) and
~(Q) are linear.T
Consíder now the last two terms in (15).. These terms reveal whether firm
1 prefers firm 2 to be better informed, holding pl constant. These terms thus
capture the incentive for firm 1 to Sncrease or decrease information to
influence revision of firms 2's beliefs.8 Notice that ~p" - 2AS2 3(p -p ),
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where i] is defined in (10) and A is the numerator in (10), so that ~p" has the
same sign as of pi-pz. Thus, if priors are common, the fourth term of (15)
vanishes. In this case, an fncrease Sn the information of firm 2 will cause a
mean-preserving increase in the riskiness of firm 2's posteríor beliefs.
Hence, íf V1 ís strictly convex (concave) in pz, then firm 1 will prefer firm
2 to be better (worse) informed and the sign of dZV1~dp2 determines firm 1's
valuation of increased informatíon to firm 2. If priors are not common,
however, then an increase in information will not result in a mean preserving
Sncrease in the rlsklness of firm 2's posterlor bellefs. Instead, the mean of
firm 2's beliefs, so firm 1 believes, will be displaced towards firm 1's
~If g(Q,7) and g(Q,7) are linear, then g(Q,7) - a-SQ and g(Q,7) - a-SQ,
where we assume a, a, ~ and ~ are such that an ínterior solution appears for
all (pl,pZ). In this case the value function for firm 1 is
V1(pl,pz) -(4aisz
{ SiaZ - 4alaZS1S2)~9Slsz - (4ais11 f RIaZ(3zZ - 4a~aZsz~]I9 where a~ - ap~ t
a(1-p~) and S~ - sp~ i s(1-p~). Straightforward calculations then yield
dZVl~dp~ ~ 0.
8To verlfy thls, flx the flrst argument of V1 at some point, say p. i
Firm 1's value functíon then becomes O(pl) - V1(pl,`~(pl));
(as an expositíonal
matter, one may interpret pl here as what firm 2's posterior beliefs would be
if firm 2 had the same prior as firm 1). ~"(pl) in this case ís precísely the
last two terms of (15), so that these terms measure firm 1's valuatfon of
providing firm 2 with a more informative signal, holding its own information
constant.- 13
prior. The value to firm 1 of this shift is captured by the fourth term of
(15). The sign of ~p" indicates whether, from firm 1's viewpoint, the mean of
flrm 2's posterior belíefs will increase or decrease, and the sign of dV1IdpZ
indicates the effect of such changae on firm 1's second period payoff.
It may be useful to contrast the manípulatíon of a rival's updating
represented by this third term with that in models of signal jamming such as
Riordan (1985), Fudenberg and Tírole (1986), and Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano
(1989a). In signal-,]amming models, the output of rivals is not observed.
Firms in these models thus have an incentive to vary output with a víew toward
pushing rivals' posterlor beliefs in a particular direction. For example, an
undetected increase in output on the part of firm 1 in the first period will
lower P for any realizatíon of e, and thus reduce firm 2's belief that the
state demand is "good" for each c. In our model, however, outputs are
observed, so that a firm cannot be assured that an increase in its output will
make íts rival more pessimistic. Instead, varying output varies the
informativeness of the price sígnal. This allows firms to affect the likely
degree to which a rival updates but not necessarily the direction in which the
rival updates.
The middle term in (15), dZV1ldpldpZ, captures the interactlon between
experímenting to revise one's own belíefs and experimenting to influence the
beliefs of one's rival. Observe that d2Vl~dpldpz ~ 0 implies that upward
[downward] revisions in pl are more valuable, the hígher [lower] is pz. Thus,
a posltíve dZV1ldpldpZ encourages firm 1 to induce larger variations in
belíefs, that is, to produce more information. In thís case, we might say
that the two motlves for experimentatíon are strategic complements.
Similarly, a negative dzVl~dpldp2 discourages the production of information:
upward [downward] revisions in pl are less valuable the higher (lower] is pz.
In this case, we might say that the two motives for experimentation are
strategic substitutes. Equation (16) and Example 2 demonstrate that if the- 14
slope only or intercept only is unknown for a linear demand curve, then
dzV1~dp~p2 ~ 0 and the two motlves are strategic substítutes.
Now consider the combined effect of the terms in (15). The first term
captures the incentive for firm one to vary its own information, and it is the
only term not weighted by either p' or rp". If these two weights are "small",
then this first term in (15) will dominate. It is easy to show that both p'
and ~y" converge to 0 as p2 converges to either 0 or 1. Thus, if firm 2 is
relatively certain of the state of demand, then fírm 1's princiopal concern
becomes whether to produce a more informative signal for itself. On the other
hand, íf firm 1 is virtually certain of the state of demand, then its
principal concern becomes whether to increase firm 2's information. In this
case, the fourth term in (15) wlll dominate. In partícular, as pi converges
to 0, ~p" will converge to -m (and the fourth term will dominate both the
second and third terms).9 If firm 1 is relatively certain that the state of
demand Ss bad, he will also be relatívely certain that flrm 2 will revivse
downward, so that if dV~~dpz is negative, firm 1 would prefer to hasten that
revision by giving firm 2 a more informative signal. On the other hand as p
i
converges to 1, ~y" will converge to tm (and the fourth term will again
dominate), since firm 1 is relatively certain that firm 2 will revise upward.
In that case, a positive dVl~dpz implies that firm 1 prefers giving fírm 2 a
more informative signal. Finally, observe that if priors are common (p - i
p2), then ~p" - 0 and ~p' - 1, so that the fourth term in (15) vanishes and the
remaíning three are weighted equally.
9To see this, multiply and divide (15) by [~p' ) to obtaln {(Vil~[rp' ]z) t
V1 ~rp' t V1 t V1~"I[~p' )z)[~p' 12. The fírst two terms ín braces converge to iz zz z
zero as pi converges to either 0 or 1, since Ip' converges to tW in either
case. The coeffícient on VZ equals 2(pi-p2)~fl. where fI is defined in (10).
Since (1 converges to zero as firm 1's beliefs converge to certainly, the claim
is established.15 -
An alternative interpretation of the decomposition may be helpful. An
increase in information, as we have noted, changes the distríbutlon of
posterlor beliefs. This change is decomposible, from the viewpoint of flrm 1,
Snto two parts: first, a mean-preserving increase in the riskiness of (p p);
i' z
and second, a dísplacement of the mean of firm 2's posterior belief towards
firm 1's prior. Sínce the first three terms of (15) are a quadratic form
involving the second cross partlal of V1 (and hence wlll be positlve of V1 is
convex in (pí,pz)). the sum of the fírst three terms captures the value of
firm 1 of the first part of this shift. The value of the second part ís then
captured by the fourth term.
(3.3) Value of Informatton
We now establish some necessary conditions for dW1IdQ1 x 0 or, equiva-
lently, necessary condítions for experimentation to occur. Let G~(p~,Q)




denote the equllibríum outputs for the second period
subgame. Then
Lemma 1. dW1~dQ - 0 if one of the following holds:
(1.1) dGl(p1,Q)~dQ - 0 for all (p1,Q);
(1.2) dQ~~dpl - 0 for all (pl,pz) e (0,1)Z and all i and ~;
where sufficient conditions for (1.1) include
(1.3) g'(Q) - g'(Q) - 0 for all Q;
(1.4) dp1ldP - 0 for all P e supp (hl).
Conditicns ( 1.1) and (1.2) are thus suffícient to induce firms to not
experiment (so that their negation Ss necessary for experimentation). We
provide an íntuitive sketch of the proof; the details are immediate. To
motívate (1.1), notice that íf dG1~dQ - 0, then variatlons in quantity cannot
affect beliefs. There is then no benefit to experimentation, giving dW1IdQ -
0 and precluding experimentation. Observe that dG1IdQ may be zero for two- 16
reasons. First, we could have g'(Q) - g'(Q) - 0 for all Q, or (1.3). If thís
equality holds, then the two inverse demand functions have the same slope at
each quantity, so that g(Q) -~(Q) is constant. For any realization of e, p
1
is then independent of Q(cf. (2)), so varying Q does not affect the
informativeness of príce. Second, dGl(p1,Q)~dQ - 0 if dp~IdP - 0 for all P e
supp(hl), or (1.4). This latter condítion holds under the MLRP if the support
of f ís "small enough" so that the price distributíons corresponding to the
two possible mean demand curves do not overlap and, for any Q, the firm learns
the value of y with probability one. For example, suppose that g(Q,-y) - 10 -
Q and g(Q,~) - 5- 2Q and that supp(f) -[-1,1). Then the firm learns the
value of 7 after observing the realization of P ín period one. If we assume
that f has support on the entire real line, then this second way to yield
dG1~dQ - 0 is precluded.
Conditlon (1.1) thus Sndicates that a necessary condltion for
experimentatlon is for the flrm to be able to alter information by ad~usting
quantity. A second necessary condítion for dW1~dQ x 0 and hence
experimentation is that alterations in information must be useful for the
e
firm. We shall say that informatíon is useless if dQ~Idpl - 0 for all (pl,p~)
e[0,11z and all i and j, or (1.2). Hence, information is useless if optimal
second-períod actions do not depend upon in~ormation. Lemma 1 then states
that the firm wíll not experiment if informatlon is useless. Straíghtforward
calculations show that U"(pl) - 0 on [0,1) if information ís useless, givíng
dW~IdQ - 0.
A comparlson of the conditions under which information is useless in
duopolistic and monopolistlc markets may help clarífy the role of the
usefulness of information in creating incentives to experiment:l0
IOif firm 1 is the only firm in the industry, so that the analysís of
monopoly experlmentation in Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano ( 1989a) applies, then
Snformation ís useless if dQi~dp3 - 0.- 17 -
Example 1. Let g(Q,~) - 60 - lOQ and g(Q,~) - 27 - Q2. It is easily verified
that the optimal output for a monopolist is 3 for either demand curve (and
for any expectatíon concerning the likely demand curve), so that information
is useless for a monopolist. Suppose now that there are two firms in the
market and that they have a common belief p that 7- y. Then it is easy to
verify that each firm would produce an output of 2 if p - 1 and an output of
(3~2)3~Z i f p- 0, so that equilibrium outputs are not índependent of beliefs
and hence information is useful in the duopoly settSng. We thus have a demand
structure which makes information useful to duopolísts but not to a monopoly,
creating incentives for the former but not the latter to experiment. However,
lf we replace g(Q,~) with 32-QZ, then duopolísts would find Snformation
useless and shun experimentation, whereas a monopolist would find information
useful and would experiment. ~
M implication of Example 1 is that the usefulness of ínformation Ss not
solely a characteristic of the demand specífication but also depends on the
number of firms and whether they cooperate. In particular, flrms whlch behave
noncooperatívely may find information useful, whereas information may become
useless if they collude. This is not the result of the firms gaining
informatlon if they collude, since prior beliefs are assumed Lo be known by
both firms and perhaps to be identical. Rather, it is due to the different
strategic forces and hence output levels under cooperation and noncooperation.
(3.4) Quantity fianipulatton
We now examine the conditlons under which dW1IdQ ~[~1 0, so that
experimentation introduces incentives for the fírm to increase (decreasel
quantity. To interpret the conditions, it is helpful to observe that if g'(Q)
-~'(Q) ~ 0 for all Q, then larger quantities yield a more informative príce
signal. Formally, if Q ~ Q, then the information structure índuced by Q is
sufficient for that induced by Q in the sense of Blackwell (1951). Intuítive-18
ly, íf g'(Q) ~ g'(Q), then an increase in Q spreads the two (expected) demand
curves apart, so that lt ís easler to distinguish between them. Similarly, Sf
g'(Q) -~'(Q) ~ 0 for all Q, then smaller outputs yíeld a more
príce signal. Then:
informative
Propoeition 1. Let the MLRP (cf. (3)) hold. Then dul(Q)~dQ ~(~) 0 íf
(1.1) g'(Q) - g'(Q) ~ (~] a;
(1.2) supp f(P-g(Q)) n f(P-g(Q)) x o; and
(1.3) Uï(pl) ~ 0 for all pl;
where a sufficíent condition for (1.3) is
i
(1.4) V Ss convex in (pl,pz) wlth at least one nonzero second partial
and (po-Pz) dV1~dpzZ 0.
Condition (1.3) ensures that information is valuable by requiring the
period-two value function to be strictly convex. Condition (1.2) ensures that
price does not always reveal the true state of demand with certalnty, so that
experímentation potentíally increases the flow of information. Condition
(1.1) lndicates that the firm will then experlment by ad~usting quantity ín a
dírectlon which pushes the mean demand curves further apart and hence makes
price more informative.
Proof. The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that dp1~dP z 0 for all
P. Condítion (1.2), the MI.RP and the continuous differentiability of f then
Smply that dp1~dP ~ 0 on a set of prlces wíth positive probabillty. The
result now follows from (1,1), (1.2), and equations (14) and (15). To see
that (1.4) ís a sufficient condition for (1.3), note that the first three
terms of (15) are a quadratic form involving second derivatives of V1, and
that the sign of ~y" is the same as the sign of (po-p?).
In the monopoly case, the requirement that the second period value
function be convex (given by (1.3)) is superfluous. As we have noted, the- 19
firm's second period value function, being the supremum of a collection of
linear functions of p, is always convex and is strictly convex whenever
information is useful. In the duopoly case, however, each firm's second
period value function is derived from payoff functions that are llnear ln
(pl,p2)
but Ss no longer the supremum of a collection of such functions, since
the other firm's output enters as an argument in its payoff functíon. It is
thus possible for information to be useful and for U~(pl) to be positlve for
some values of pl and negative for other values. Hence, St is possible for
information to be useful, condítions (1.1) and (1.2) of Proposition 1 and the
MLRP to hold, and yet for (1.3) to fail and hence for dw1ldQ - 0 for some
value of Q1.
I1
To illustrate the conditions under which (1.4) holds, we can note that
the simplest specificatlon which gives convexlty of V1 is g(Q,~) L~- Q,
where ~~ y- and y ~ 2~. (The latter inequalíty ensures an interíor solutlon
for both firms.) For this case of parallel, linear demand curves with
intercept uncertainty, it is easy to verify that
V1(P1.Pz) - (271 - 3'Z)zI9, (16)
where 7t -:P~ t~(1-p1). (16) is clearly convex Sn (pl,pz) with dZV1Idp~ ~ 0
for 1- 1,2.12 Moreover, dV1~dp2 ~ 0, so that (1.9) holds for pZ s po
The convexity of V1 in (pl,pZ), requlred by (1.4), holds for the
preceding example but is a stringent assumption. The followíng example shows
that the convexity of V1 may fail in our duopoly game.
llAn
example may be constructed illustrating this possibilíty using our
speclfication in Example 2 below.
12Notíce, however, that while informatíon is valuable in this specifíca-
tíon, changing quantity cannot effect the informativeness of price under our
assumption of an additive noíse disturbance that is independent of Q. Hence,
neither firm would adjust its best reply map from the myopic case.
Experimentation may occur with these mean demand curves if the noise
dlsturbance ís not independent of Q. See Creane (1989).- Zo
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as (371 - 4yz) ~[~) 0. Observe now that íf priors are identical, so that
p1 - pz, then dzVlldpz ~ 0, so that V1 is not convex on (0,1]z. ~
It ís straightforward to use the results of Propositíon 1 to construct
cases in which experimentation leads firms to increase or decrease output.
However, Proposition 1 treats only cases in which informatíon is valuable, so
that the firm is always attempting to increase the informativeness of price.
An interesting question is then whether a firm would ever adjust íts output to
reduce information. The next example demonstrates that a firm may reduce its
output in order to reduce information. In the process, it should be clear- 21 -
that a counterpart to Propositlon 1 for cases in which information has
negative value ís easily constructed by reversing the inequalíty signs in the
first line of Proposition 1 and in ( 1.3) and suitably altering ( 1.4). The
equilibrium analysis of Section IV develops condltlons under which information
has a posítive or negative value.
Example 3. Consíder the random slope specífication of Example 2. In thís
case, g' (Q) ~ ~' (Q), so that, Sf the ML.RP holds, a hlgher output leads to a
more lnformative prlce signal. Suppose that é is uniformly distrlbuted on
[-1,1].13 Then each firm's posterior belíefs are given by
1 if P e(a-fQtl, a-~Q;11
pi(P,Q) - P~ if P e (a-gQ-1, a-~Qt11
0 Sf P e Ia-TQ-1, a-7Q-1)
provided that a- 7Q -1 ~ a- yQ t 1, or (~-r)Q ~ 2. (Thls inequallty may be
assured ín a neighborhood of the myopic equilíbríum industry output by
choosing a sufficiently small a.) From (18),
V1(pl,pZ) - az(27z-71)z~9717z.
Since e is unlformly distributed on (-1,1], we have from (12) that
z z P (1-p ) (2~o-To)z
W1(Q) - 97 (7)z (2~z-3'ío)z } 18 (7-y)Q 71 ' ~ 1 - 70(7 ) z )~
(19)
i z 1 2
where 7~ - p~~ t(1-pi)~. Slnce ~- g~ 0, ( 19) ís decreasing in Q whenever
the bracketed expressíon is negative. The simplest way to make this
expression negative is to let 7Z - 27i. From (17), thís implies that the
myopic equilibrium involves firm 2 producing zero output. Under this
assumption, the bracketed expression in (19) becomes
13The uniform distribution does not satísfy the strong versíon of the MLRP
we use, but it does satisfy a weaker verslon and can be approxlmated
arbítrarily closely by distributions that satisfy the verslon we use.- 22 -
pi (1-pi) 9 4po~7i t(1-pi)747i - 97Z
- t - -
a' 7 47i 47~go
(20)
Hence, we will have our example in which the experímenting fírm reduces output
in order to reduce Snformatíon if we can find 7, ~, a, po and pz such that
(20) is negative, 72 - 271. and a ~ 47I(~-7). (The final ínequality ensures
that the myopic equilibrium industry output satisfies Q ~ 2~(7-7) and hence
that an increase in Q will increase ínformation.) The following values
satisfy these constraints:
a - 1~3 po - 2~3
7 z S p2 - 1I12
7 - 1.
Example 3 ís our first result to make use of noncommon priors. Example 4
below shows that an analogous result can be obtaíned wíth common priors in a
somewhat more complex demand specification.
IV. Equilibrium: Characterization
The preceding analysis has examined the effect of the ability of firms to
manipulate the informativeness of price on their first-period best reply
mappings. We now ínvestigate the effect of such manipulations on equilibrium
perlod-one quantltíes.
(4.1) Quantity-Increasing Experimentatton
We restrict attentíon to the case of equal prior beliefs. Second period
beliefs will then also be identical, so that the (assumed unique)
second-period equílíbríum will be symmetrlc. Thís in turn ímplíes that the
payoff functions gíven in (S) for the game 1" will be symmetric, so that the
best reply mappings of the two firms are identical. Let v denote this common
s
~~
best reply mapping for I' when pi - pZ. Let Q` denote the ( symmetríc)- 23
period-one equllíbrium output for each firm in the two-period game and let Q
denote the myopically-optimal period-one output. ,
Lemma 2, which follows immediately from Propositíon 1, now implíes that
Sf each firm's second-perlod value functlon Ss strictly convex in the (common)
posterior belief parameter, then in a symmetric equilibrium, the presence of
íntertemporal information flows will push industry output in whichever
direction generates more information. Lemma 2 also contains condltions under
which thís directíon ís known to be either an increase or decrease in
quantity.
Lemma 2. Let 0 s pi - pz s 1 and let the P4RP (as given in (3)) hold. Then
Uw ~i if
Q ~[~1 Q for all Q e v(Q ) if . . o . .
(2.1) g' ~ l~l ~' on suPP (g):
(2.2) suPP (f(P-gf2Qn)) n supp (f(P-g(2Q~)) m e;
(2.3) d2V~(p,p)Idp2 ~ 0 for all p e(0,1) and i- 1,2.
Condition (2.3) ímposes the requirement that the second-period value
function Ss strictly convex and hence that information is useful. Condition
(2.2) ensures that the príce does not always reveal the true state of demand
with certaínty in the myopic equilibrium, so that there is some scope for
experlmentation. Condítion (2.1) then Sndicates that the firm will ad~ust
output in that direction which spreads the two mean demand curves farther
apart.
The following result demonstrates that, if g(Q) and g(Q) are both linear
Sn Q and have different horizontal intercepts, then conditlon (2.3) holds and
hence informatíon is valuable.
Proposition 2. If g(Q) and g(Q) are both linear in Q with g(0)~g'(0) x
g(0)~g'(O), then (2.3) of Lemma 2 holds. Hence, given the lU..RP and (2.2), the
!f i~~ itp
slgn of Q - Q for any Q e v(Q ) mataches the sign of g'(Q) - g'(Q).
s s s s s- 24 -
Proof. If both demand functions are linear, they must be of the form g(Q) - a
-~Q and g(Q) - a-~(Q). It is then readily verified that, under identical
beliefs, the second períod value function for each flrm is
y~(p.P) -
(ap i a(1-P))z
9(RP t (1-P)S) ,
which is strictly convex Sn p if aJs x oc~s (equivalently, g(0)Ig'(0) x
g(O)I~'(0)). m
Hence, Snformatíon has positive value when demand curves are llnear with
different horízontal intercepts. Since Aghion, Espinosa and Jullien (1990)
analyze príce-setting duopolists with identical priors, Lemma 2 ís the
homogeneous-products, quantity-setting analogue to theír Proposítions 2 and 5.
(4.2) Quantlty-Decreasing Expertmentation
Lemma 2 deals with the case in which information has positive value, as
does Proposition 1. As is the case with Proposition 1, we can create a
versíon of Lemma 2 for the case in which informatlon has negative value by
reversing the inequalities in the second line of the Lemma and in (2.3). We
illustrate this result by presenting an example in which equilibrium period 1
output in the two-period game is lower than the myopic equilibrium output,
even though lower output implies a less lnformatlve price signal. The example
is reconciled with Proposition 2 by noting that the example contains nonlinear
demand curves, contrary to the assumptions of Proposition 2.
Example 4. Let b e{b,b}. Let b- b with probability p. Then let expected
demand be glven by
P(Q) - 1 t
Qz
where Q- Q1 t QZ and b- pb t(1-p)b. If p is the common posterior then firm
i's first order condition for period-two profit maximization is given by- 25
1 t 1 - bQ - Q L
? t 1 - b J Qz Q ~ Q3 Qz - 0.
Th1s condition ímmedlately lmplies that if there is an equ111brium, St must be
symmetrlc, and there ls at most one symmetric equllibrium. Solvíng thls first
order condition under the hypothesis of symmetry gives
Q~ z .5(3b)'.s
.
One readíly verifies that n~(Q~,Q~,p1) is strlctly concave in Q~, and hence Q1
is an equílibrium, Sf b ~ 1~12. The value functlon can then be calculated to
be
V(P) - lI3 t .5(3b)'s.
This is globally concave in p. This creates an incentive for each fírm to
decrease output in order to decrease information, leading to (symmetric)
period-one outputs which are lower than their myopic counterparts. ~
It !s interesting to note that we can generate an analogous result with
linear demand curves lf we allow prior beliefs to differ:
Example 5. Consider the random slope specification of Example 3 with e










The payoff functlons for the game I' are glven by
II1(Q1.Qz) - Ia - 71(Q1tQz))Q3 t óA1 t ó(Q1tQz)B1- 26
uhere
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One can verify that the folloaing values yield the desired result:- 27 -
a - 1`10 y - 1
p a 2I3 ~ ~ 5 1
0
PZ - 1I12.
Examples 4 and 5 demonstrate that Proposítion 2 is not robust to relaxation of
the linear demand and common prior assumptions, so that (2.3) can fail and
flrms seek to decrease information if demand ís nonlinear or priors not
common.
V. Equilibríttm: Existence
Ne now investlgate the conditions under which an equilibríum exísts.
Existence in pure strategies ís problematic. wlthout severe restríctlons on
the demand functions and the distríbutlon of the noíse term, the value
functions V1 may not be concave in first period output. As a result, the
payoff functions in (5) may not be quasiconcáve in the firms' outputs (even
though the first period payoff function Ss concave), whlch in turn may
preclude existence.
Since the first period best reply mappings will not ín general be
síngle-valued (because Vt may not be concave ín first period output), we
examine mixed strategles. To reformulate our model accordingly, let D denote
the space of (Borel) probability measures on R. A mixed strategy for firm 1
i
is an element {~t e D. (As we show in the proof of Proposítion 3 below, we may
restrlct our attentlon to probabillty measures on a compact subset of R.)
Firm 1's payoff function is now a mapping from D x D into R gíven by
JJrz1(Q
Q P )dp (Q )dk (Q ) ~ óffW (Q tQ )dp (Q )d~t (Q ) (20)
t' 2' t t 1 2 2 1 1 z 1 1 2 z
where n1 is given in (1), Ll1 is given in (12), and (p1,{~Z) e DxD. A mlxed
r r
s[rategy equilibrium for fis a pair (~tl,ltz) E DxD sueh that,- 28 -
JJRl(Q1.QZ.PO)d~il(Q3)d{t2(Qz) t SJJNl(Q1tQ2)d~ll(Ql)d~lz(Qz)
- jfnl(Q .Q P)dit (Q )d{t~(Q ) t
SJJW
(Q tQ )d{t (Q )dl~~(Q ).
i z' i t i z z i i z t i z z
for all ul E D, with a simílar condition for firm 2.
We have the following existence theorem:
Proposition 3. Suppose that there exists a Q such that, for g- g and g-~,
(3.1) supp (g) s [O,Q],
(3.2) g is concave and strictly decreasing on [O,Q1,
(3.3) g Ss twlce continuously dlfferentiable on (O,Q),
(3.4) g is constant on (Q,m),14
Then 1" has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from standard existence proofs after establishing
continuity of the payoff functions and compactness of the strategy sets (since
the payoff functíon (21) is quasi-concave on the set of mixed strategies, D).
To demonstrate compactness of strategy sets, observe that g and ~ are
nonpositive on (Q.m) and that changes in output cannot affect the informatíve-
ness of price on (Q,m). We may thus without loss of generality take each
firm's pure strategy set to be the closed interval (O,Q].
To demonstrate continuity of the payoff functions given in (5) in first
period quantitles, note first that (3.1)-(3.4) imply the existence of a unlque
r .




the conditions imposed on g, Q~ is continuous in (p~,pZ) for í- 1,2
15
14By supp (g) we mean the set of quantities on which g specifies posltive
prices. To achieve the conditions of Proposition 3 it may be necessary to
allow g or g to specify some negative expected prices (recall that price can
be thought of as being net of„marginal cost) and to become horízontal (at a
zero or negative price) after Q.
15If Q~(pl,pZ) is not continuous, then there exists a converging sequence
of values of (pl,pZ), with limit (pí,pz), for whích the assoclated sequence of- 29
Moreover, slnce h is contlnuous, pl and pZ are contlnuous functions of flrst
period output, so that V~ is continuous Sn fírst-period output. Hence, II~ in
(5) is continuous, for i- 1,2.
The proposition now folloxs from an application of the existence theorem
in Glicksberg (1952), who demonstrates that continuíty of the payoff functions
and compactness of the strategy sets are sufficient for the existence of a
mlxed strategy equillbrium. ~
In order to slmplify the exposition, sectlons III and IV considered only
pure strategles. GSven that we can only ensure existence with the help of
mixed strategies, ít is useful to note that the previous analysis may be
modlfied to accommodate mixed strategies. For example, in Proposition 1 we
demonstrated that lf W~ is increasing (say) Sn Q, then every element of firm
i's best reply mapping for I' must exceed fírm 1's (single-valued) myopic best
reply. If we permít míxed strategies, observe that a firm's myoplc best reply
is a degenerate probabillty measure. Then íf W~ is increasing in Q, every
element in the support of firm í's best (mlxed strategy) reply for r must
exceed firm 1's myopic best reply (for a glven mixed strategy of the other
firm). Hence, the extension of Proposition 1 to mixed strategies is
immedlate.
In Lemma 2, we demonstrated that if prior beliefs are ídentical, then the
equilibrium industry output for I' in a symmetric equilibrium exceeds industry
output in the myopic game lf each firm's second period value functlon is
strictly convex in the common belief parameter and íf increasing industry
output increases the informativeness of the prlce signal. The generallzation
to mixed strategies is that, under the foregoing conditlons, the support of
Qi does not converge. Then given the compactness of strategy sets, the latter
sequence must contain two converging subsequences with distinct limits. Each
limit is then part of a period-two equilibrium for beliefs (pí,pZ), contra-
dicting our uniqueness assumptlon (cf. A4).- 30
the probability distribution for industry output under any symmetric mixed
strategy equilíbrium of 1' cannot lie entirely below the industry output in the
one-perlod game. If g and ~ are both linear, then the expected industry
output under any symmetríc mixed strategy equilibríum of i' cannot be less than
the equilibrium output of the single period game. This conclusíon follows
from the mixed-strategy versíon of Proposition 1 after observing that, if the
demand functions are linear, then the single-period best response depends only
on the expected output of one's riva1.16
VI. Conclusion
We have examined a duopoly market in which firms can experiment, or
adjust their period-one quantíties away from myopic optima in order to alter
the lnformatlveness of prlce. Our most signlflcant departure from prevlous
signal-jammíng studies lies in our assumptíon that firms can observe their
rival's outputs. We think that this is a realistic assumption in at least
some markets.
This assumption has a dramatic effect on the incentives facing the firms.
In traditional models of this type, firms alter their quantities in order to
push their rival's posterior belíefs in a particular direction. In our
analysis, firms cannot systematically affect the dlrectíon of rival belief
16To see this, let Q denote the first-period myopic equilíbrium output of
s
each firm. (There is a unique symmetric myopic equilibríum of the síngle-
period game given common priors.) Let ({~i,{~2) denote a symmetric mixed
strategy equíllbrium of i'. If fQ dp'(Q ) ~ Q, then the myopic best response
e s r s
of firm 1 to {~~ is to produce some Qí ~ Q1 with probability 1 if the demand
functions are linear (slnce the single-period best response is a decreasing
function of the expected output of fírm 2 if the demand functions are linear).
Moreover, under the conditions listed in the text, W1(Q) is increasing in Q.
Consequently, by the extensíon of Proposition 1 to mixed strategies, the
support of firm 1's best reply to ~ti in i must líe above Ql and therefore
above fQ dp'(Q ), lmplying that (p' {~') is not an equilibrium.
~ s r 1' 2- 31
revision, but can affect the degree of belief revisíon by affecting the
informativeness of price.
We examine a duopoly market, unlike previous models of monopoly
experimentation. The effect of this difference is again dramatic. Infor-
matlon always has nonnegatlve value to a monopolist. In contrast, flrms Sn a
duopoly market may strlctly prefer to have less information.
We first establish necessary conditions for experlmentation to occur
(Lemma 1), including that second perlod actions must depend upon informatlon
and information must in turn depend upon first-period price. While these
condítions are straightforward, we present examples in which duopoly firms may
face Sncentives to experiment but a monopoly (or colluding duopoly) in the
same market would not experiment, and vice versa. We then establish
conditions under which experimentatíon will íntroduce incentives for firms to
either increase or decrease quantity, under the presumption that information
has positive value (Proposition 1). Intuitively, the fírm will adJust output
so as to spread the mean demand curves farther apart, thus makíng prlce more
informative. The presumption that information has positive value is
nontrivial, and we present examples to show that information may have negatíve
value and that firms may decrease output in order to decrease the informative-
ness of price. Finally, Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 extend Proposition 1 to
equilibrlum outputs, in the process developing conditions under which
information is valuable.
Our results contribute to the understanding of how informational concerns
can affect strategíc interactions between firms. Our results suggest that the
nature of these informational concerns can depend critically on the structure
of the market. In partícular, the incentives to produce more or less
informatlon can differ depending upon how many firms occupy the market and on
the variables these flrms can observe.- 32
VII. Supplemental Notes: Derivation of (14)
To begin, note from (6) that
dh1ldQ - -Pif'g' - (1-pi)f'g'.
so that (13) becomes
(22)
dW1IdQ - JIUi(P1) dQl hl(P) - U1(pl)IPof'g'f(1-P1)f'g'1JdP. (23)
After integratíng the second term in (23) by parts, we obtain
dW1IdQ - ~Ui(P1)L dQl hl(P) t[Pofg't(1-P1)fg'1 dPl ]dP. (24)




Differentlating (25) with respect to P and wíth respect to Q yields




dpl - pof'g' - pl(dh1ldQ)
dQ - hl





- g' dPl r f'(1-PO)(g'-~').
Inserting (28) Snto (27) and then using (26) gives
dp
i
dQ - g' dpl - IPlf~(1-po)(g'-g'))Ihl.
Insertíng (29) Snto (24) now gives
dW
t







- (g'-~')IJUi(pl) dpl (1-P1)fdP t J
Ui(pl)plf'(1-po)dPJ
. (30)
We can now Sntegrate the second term in brackets in (30) by parts to give
J
U~(pl)plf'(1-po)dP
j P r P
U1(P1)plf(1-Po)J~~ - JUt(pi) dPl Plf(1-Po)dP - J
Ui(P1) dPl f(1-Po)dP
- J
Uï(P1) dpl p3f(1-po)dP - J
U1(P1) ~1 f(1-po)dP. (31)
Insertíng (31) into (30) yields (14). ~- 34
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